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Provisions and Potential Impacts of the 
Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program 
 
By Kent Olson and Matt DalSanto 
November 2008 
 
ABSTRACT:  The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program is a new, optional 
safety net for farmers provided by Congress in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 
(commonly called the farm bill). Choosing this new safety net is not an obvious choice. Farmers 
who choose to elect this program also must accept a 20% reduction in direct payments and a 
30% reduction in marketing assistance loan rates. In this paper, we describe the general 
provisions and calculations of the ACRE and counter-cyclical payment (CCP) programs and 
present our estimates of potential payments under the two programs.  
If prices are expected to remain at or above the ACRE price guarantee, CCP is the best 
choice since government payments are expected to be lower under the ACRE program—as 
shown in the first price scenario. However, if national market prices fall sufficiently, the ACRE 
program becomes the best choice since ACRE payments will be higher—as shown in the third 
price scenario. The national market price does not have to be much lower for ACRE to be the 
preferred choice—as shown for wheat-soybean farms in the third price scenario.  
It is essentially impossible to describe simple rules of thumb or breakeven prices to help 
farmers decide whether to sign up for ACRE or stay with CCP. This difficulty is due to several 
factors: the complexity of the program rules, the requirement to sign up all program crops on a 
farm, the potential government payment for only one crop even though direct payments and loan 
rates are cut for all crops, the uncertainty of future prices and yields, and the variation in how an 
individual farm’s yields vary in relationship to its state yields.   2
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The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program is a new, optional safety net for 
farmers provided by Congress in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (commonly 
called the farm bill). The ACRE program will be available starting with the 2009 crop year as an 
alternative to receiving counter-cyclical payments. ACRE is based on changes in crop revenue; 
counter-cyclical payments (CCP) are based only on changes in crop prices. Direct payments 
(DPs) and loan deficiency payments (LDPs) will remain in both programs.  
At first, farmers may find this safety net based on crop revenue (that is, both prices and 
yield) appealing as an alternative to the safety net based on crop prices only. Choosing this new 
safety net is not, however, an obvious choice. Farmers who choose to elect this program also 
must accept a 20% reduction in direct payments and a 30% reduction in marketing assistance 
loan rates. Choosing ACRE is an irrevocable election meaning a farmer cannot go back to the 
counter-cyclical payments even if future market conditions make the counter-cyclical payment 
larger than the ACRE payment. The choice greatly hinges on whether commodity prices will 
stay at or near current levels or decrease—even if they don’t drop all the way to levels seen even 
just two years ago. The choice also depends on the variability of the individual farm’s yields and 
that farm’s State yields. As described more fully in the next section, before the government will 
write a check to an individual farmer, a revenue loss must occur both at the state level and on an 
individual farm. So the strength of the relationship between an individual farm’s revenue and its 
state revenue is also critical to a farmer’s choice of ACRE. These complexities essentially take 
away any possibility to develop simple decision rules or breakeven prices for farmers to make 
the decision to choose ACRE. 
In the next section, we describe the general provisions and calculations of the ACRE and 
CCP programs. In the subsequent section, we present our estimates of potential payments under 
the two programs. Some concluding comments are presented at the end of the paper. 
 
   3
ACRE Program Payments 
The ACRE program is based on the level and changes in individual farm yields, State 
yields, and national marketing year prices. An individual farm’s yields are used to determine 
whether a farm is eligible for an ACRE payment, but the State yield and the national price are 
used to determine the payment amount. All of the crops on a farm (that are listed as covered 
crops in the farm bill) have to be signed up for the ACRE program. Payments, however, are 
made on an individual crop basis; that is, one or more crops may receive ACRE payments in a 
certain year while others do not.  
Before a payment can be made under the ACRE program, two revenue tests need to be 
made: (1) a State level revenue loss and (2) an individual farm revenue loss. First, for each 
covered commodity, the actual State revenue for the crop year has to less than the ACRE 
program guarantee for that crop year. Second, in order to receive a payment, an individual 
farmer’s actual farm revenue has to be less than that farm’s ACRE benchmark revenue. Both of 
these losses have to occur for a farmer to be able to receive a payment.  
An individual farm may have a devastating loss but receive no ACRE payment if the 
State level revenue does not drop enough (or does not drop at all). Alternatively, a State may 
have a large loss in revenue due to, say widespread drought in the State, and many farms may 
receive an ACRE payment due to individual losses, however, other individual farms will not 
receive an ACRE payment if their yield does not suffer.  
Also, farms in one State may receive ACRE payments because both the individual and 
State revenue tests are met. But farms just across the border in another State may not receive 
payments because their State does not fail the revenue test even though these neighboring 
individual farms also suffer sufficient individual revenue losses. 
 
State Revenue Test 
  If actual State revenue is less than the State ACRE guarantee for a covered commodity, 
the farms in that State are potentially eligible for an ACRE payment for that covered commodity. 
The actual State revenue for a particular year is the actual State yield times the national 
average market price. The actual State yield is the quantity produced divided by the acres planted 
to that crop—not the harvested acreage. The national average market price is the maximum of 
the national average market price and that crop’s loan rate.   4
 
Actual State Revenue =  
actual state yield * national average market price 
 
Actual state yield =  
quantity produced / acres planted to crop 
 
National average market price =  
Maximum of nat’l average market price or loan rate 
 
The State revenue guarantee for a particular year is 90% of the benchmark State yield 
times the ACRE program guarantee price for that particular year. The benchmark State yield is 
the Olympic average
1 of the 5 most recent annual State average yields using National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) data. The ACRE program guarantee price is the simple 
average of the national average market price for the most recent two years. Thus, the State 
revenue guarantee will vary from year. However, for the 2010-2012 crop years, the ACRE 
guarantee cannot change more than 10% from the guarantee for the preceding crop year. 
 
State ACRE guarantee =  
0.9 * benchmark State yield * ACRE program guarantee price 
 
 
Benchmark State yield =  
Olympic average of 5 most recent State yields 
 
 
ACRE program guarantee price =  
simple average of the national average market price  
for the most recent 2 years 
 
Individual Farm Revenue Test 
  If actual farm revenue is less than the Farm ACRE Benchmark Revenue for a covered 
commodity, the farm is potentially eligible for an ACRE payment for that covered commodity. 
An individual farm’s actual farm revenue is the actual farm yield times the national 
average market price for that crop year. 
                                                 
1 An Olympic average is the simple average of the remaining three yields in this case after removing the highest and 
lowest yields from the list of the most recent 5 yields. For example, if the most recent 5 State corn yields are 146, 
159, 174, 161, and 165, the Olympic average of these yields is 161.67 which is the simple average of 159, 161, and 
165 after throwing out 146 and 174.   5
 
Actual Farm Revenue =  
actual farm yield * national average market price 
 
An individual farm’s ACRE benchmark revenue is the sum of (1) the Olympic average 
farm yield for the most recent 5 years times the ACRE program guarantee price for the 
applicable year and (2) the crop insurance premium required to be paid by the farmer.  
 
Farm ACRE Benchmark Revenue = 
(Olympic average farm yield for most recent 5 years * 
ACRE program guarantee price for applicable crop year) 
+ (crop insurance premium required to by paid by farmer) 
 
Estimation of ACRE Payment 
If the two revenue tests show losses at both the State and individual farm levels, a 
specific farm’s ACRE payment will be the (1) minimum of (a) the difference between the State 
ACRE program guarantee and the actual State revenue (but not less than zero) or (b) 25% of the 
ACRE program guarantee times (2) 0.833 (0.85 for 2012) times (3) the farm acreage planted 
times (4) the farm’s five-year Olympic average yield divided by the benchmark State yield. This 
farm-to-State yield adjustment is made to reflect differences in productivity within a State. 
 
ACRE Payment Amount = 
{Minimum of (ACRE program guarantee – actual State revenue) or  
0.25 * ACRE program guarantee)} 
* {0.833 (or 0.85 for 2012) * farm acreage planted} 
* {Olympic average farm yield for 5 most recent crop years / benchmark State yield} 
 
 
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) 
The counter-cyclical program is essentially the same in the new farm bill as it was in the 
previous farm bill. The only differences are that some prices and rates are changed from the 
previous bill. These changes do not affect the major crops in Minnesota. 
A counter-cyclical payment (CCP) is made if the national seasonal average market price 
is less than the target price minus the direct payment rate. These target prices and direct 
payments are the same in the 2002 and 2008 Acts for corn, soybean, and wheat except the target 
prices for wheat and soybean will increase in 2010 (Table 1).  The CCP is calculated as the target   6
price minus the direct payment minus the higher of the national season average market price or 
the loan rate. For example, a corn farmer will receive a CCP if the national seasonal market price 
falls below $2.35 which is the target price of $2.63 minus the direct payment of $0.28. For corn, 
the maximum CCP per bushel is $0.40 per bushel which is the difference between $2.35 and the 
loan rate of $1.95. The total CCP for a farmer is the product of that year’s CCP per bushel, the 
farm’s payment yield, and 85% of the farm’s acreage base. 
 
Table 1. Direct payments, target prices, and loan rates for corn, soybean, and 
wheat in the 2002 and 2008 Acts. 






Corn  0.28 2.63 1.95 
Soybean  0.44 5.80* 5.00 
Wheat 0.52  3.92*  2.75* 
*Target prices will increase to $6.10 for soybean and $4.17 for wheat starting 
with the 2010 crop.  The loan rate for wheat will increase to $2.94 in 2010. 
 
Cyclical Payments for each commodity crop are calculated as the product of the CCP Rate, the 
Payment Yield, and 85% of the Base Acreage.  The CCP Rate is calculated as the Target Price 
minus the Direct Payment (DP) Rate minus the maximum of the Market Price and the Loan Rate.  
If the sum of the DP Rate and the Market Price exceeds the Target Price, then a payment is not 
made.  
 
] 85 0 x [ x x .     s) (Base Acre      Yield)  (Payment     )  (CCP Rate CCP i i i i =  
  0, R      (CCP Rate) i i } =   max{        where  




Direct payments (DPs) are paid to farmers of covered crop commodities on the basis of 
the direct payment specified in the Act, 85% of their base acres for the crop, and their payment 
yield for the crop. The payment is made regardless of current production levels, market 
conditions, and price levels. Under the ACRE program, the DP rate is reduced by 20%. 
 
] 85 0 x [ x x .     s) (Base Acre     Yield)  (Payment     (DP Rate) DP i i i i =  
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Loan Deficiency Payments 
Under the Marketing Assistance Loan Program, farmers can take a loan at harvest at the 
loan rate set in the Act. This program is designed to provide farmers the cash needed to pay bills 
without having to sell their product at typically low harvest prices. These are nonrecourse loans 
so farmers have the option to either pay back the loan plus interest costs or forfeit the crop 
pledged as collateral to the CCC. Farmers have the option to choose, and usually do choose, to 
receive a loan deficiency payment (LDP) in place of taking the loan. If the local county market 
price is below the national loan rate, the local LDP is the difference between the local market 
price and the national loan rate. If the market price is above the loan rate, no LDPs are available. 
Under the 2002 Act, the receipt of the LDP was not conditioned on the sale of the commodity; 
thus, the commodity could be held and sold at prices higher than the price used to determine the 
LDP received. 
LDPs are calculated as the product of (1) the difference between the Loan Rate and the 
local price, (2) the payment yield, and (3) the normal acreage.  If the local price exceeds the loan 
rate, no LDP is issued. Under the ACRE program, the loan rate is reduced by 30%. 
 
  cres)  (Normal A   Yield)  (Payment  (Price) ) (Loan Rate 0,    LDP i i i i i x  x } ] [   max{ − =  
 
 
Data and Analysis Methods 
The farmer’s choice between the CCP and ACRE programs is evaluated on the basis of 
the potential total government payment (TGP) which is a simple summation of DP, CCP (or 
ACRE) and LDP. Since so many related variables can affect final payment levels, the expected 
values of potential payments provide a more accurate view of the impact of choosing CCP versus 
ACRE compared to make estimates on only a few sets of yields and prices.. To estimate the 
expected payments, the program rules described above and the data described in this section 
below are incorporated into an Excel© using the add-in program, @Risk© (Palisade 
Corporation, 2006). 
  We use the historical yield data from seventeen farms in Minnesota (Table 2). This 
individual farm data was coupled with historical national prices and State yields and rules for the 
CCP, ACRE, DP and LDP programs. For the example farms in Cottonwood, Faribault, Goodhue,   8
and Pipestone, each farm’s actual acreage was used for the cropping mix.  For the example farms 
in Pennington and Polk, we had data on total planted acreage but not individual crop acreage, so 
we divided the total acreage into half soybean and half wheat since very little corn is historically 
grown in these two counties.  The example farms had other crop and livestock enterprises, but 
we focused only on the corn, wheat, and soybean crops for this analysis. 
 























Corn and soybean farms: 
Cottonwood 1  Southwest  1052  171  40  -- 
Cottonwood 2  Southwest  886  168  44  -- 
Cottonwood 3  Southwest  1041  170  46  -- 
Faribault 1  South 
Central 
1043 182  51  -- 
Faribault 2  South 
Central 
340 186  55  -- 
Goodhue 1  Southeast  149  158  39  -- 
Goodhue 2  Southeast  754  168  41  -- 
Goodhue 3  Southeast  1300  180  43  -- 
Pipestone 1  Southwest  472  147  44  -- 
Pipestone 2  Southwest  170  164  49  -- 
Pipestone 3  Southwest  764  168  47  -- 
Wheat and soybean farms: 
Pennington 1  Northwest  1976  --  25  45 
Pennington 2  Northwest  1653  --  26  52 
Pennington 3  Northwest  1758  --  21  41 
Polk 1  Northwest  1663  --  34  61 
Polk 2  Northwest  1612  --  26  48 
Polk 3  Northwest  469  --  26  49 
 
 
Historical state yields and national crop prices were obtained from National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) data. Future yields were projected based on deviations from the yield 
trend estimated through the standard statistical procedure of ordinary least squares (OLS). The 
statistical distributions of yields and prices including the correlations between yields and prices   9
were estimated from the historical data and incorporated into the analysis to allow for the joint 
movements of price and yield.   
If the acreage planted for a farm in a given year was missing, the missing acreage value 
was estimated as the simple average of the planted acreage in the preceding and subsequent 
years.  If there was only acreage data available in subsequent years, the missing value was 
estimated as the subsequent year’s value. 
If some yield data for a specific farm was missing, its value was estimated as the 
expected yield estimated from a standard statistical regression on the years we had available. 
The actual payment yields for commodity crops were not available so, based on historical 
data, payment yields for individual example farms were assumed to be 93.5% of the average 
yields for the 1998-2001 seasons. 
For each example farm, the base acreage for a commodity crop was assumed equal to the 
average planted acreage for the crop in the 1998-2001 seasons.   
Four price scenarios of expected national prices and ACRE guarantee prices were used to 
estimate potential government payments under the CCP and ACRE programs (Table 3). The first 
scenario (P1) has the national market price higher than the ACRE guarantee price. While the 
actual prices are lower than current levels, this price scenario provides a fairly accurate look at 
the farmers’ choice if the future national price were higher than the ACRE guarantee. In the 
second scenario (P2), the national prices are the same as in the first scenario, but the ACRE 
guarantee prices are higher and closer to the market projections. This scenario reflects what 
might happen in 2009 if national prices stabilized at higher levels for the 2008 crop thus raising 
the ACRE guarantee price for the 2009 crop. The third price scenario (P3) depicts the conditions 
if national prices dropped drastically but under ACRE rules, the ACRE guarantee prices would 
not decrease in the first year of the drop in national prices. The fourth scenario (P4) reflects the 
results if market prices and ACRE guarantee prices returned to the average levels in 2001-2005. 
This scenario is unlikely to occur in the near term, but it is an interesting look at how the CCP 
and ACRE programs would compare if national prices were actually below the target prices for 
these crops. In scenarios P1 and P2, the national marketing year price estimates was from the 
projections for 2007 made in late 2006 by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI). In scenario P3, the national price was from FAPRI’s projection made in 2005. For each 
of the projections, the national price was assumed to have a mean equal to the projected price   10




Table 3. Price scenarios used in the analysis 
   Corn  Soybeans  Wheat 
P1 – Current situation with guarantee prices lower than market prices 
P1 - National Price  3.97  10.30  6.68 
P1 - ACRE Guarantee Price  3.52  8.42  5.46 
 
P2 – Guarantee prices closer to market prices 
P2 - National Price  3.97  10.30  6.68 
P2 - ACRE Guarantee Price  3.95  10.07  7.09 
 
P3 – Market prices fall steeply below currently estimated guarantee prices 
P3 - National Price  2.20  5.25  3.39 
P3 - ACRE Guarantee Price  3.52  8.42  5.46 
 
P4 – Both market prices and guarantee prices are at 2001-05 average levels 
P4 - National Price  2.15  5.73  3.31 
P4 - ACRE Guarantee Price  2.15  5.73  3.31 
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the @Risk program© (Palisade, 2006) is used 
to conduct a Monte Carlo simulation within Microsoft Excel© with draws for price and yield 
coming from the distributions described above. Each farm’s average crop revenue, resulting 
government payment, and the variation in those revenues are estimated. To establish an accurate 
distribution of potential results, up to 10,000 statistical estimates of prices and yields are taken 
from the statistical relationships. These estimates or draws are used to calculate crop revenue and 
potential government payments under the rules of the CCP and ACRE programs.    11
RESULTS 
  Using the historical information for each of the 17 farms described above and national 
and state price and yield information, the expected total government payments are estimated for 
each of the price scenarios (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Expected total government payments (TGP) with Counter-cyclical Payments (CCP) and the 
Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) programs for the four price scenarios ($/farm) 
County  Price scenario 1    Price scenario 3    Price scenario 3    Price scenario 4 
& Farm  CCP  ACRE    CCP  ACRE   CCP  ACRE   CCP  ACRE 
Corn and soybean farms 
Co1 23,036  18,602    23,036  20,801   51,121  85,253    50,389  20,208 
Co2 19,704  15,807    19,704  16,755   45,542  74,706    43,560  16,731 
Co3 25,177  20,334    25,177  22,561   57,880  96,406    55,732  21,957 
Fa1 21,435  17,540    21,435  20,964   49,796  94,641    47,076  19,662 
Fa2 8,018  6,546    8,018  7,547    19,609  35,360    19,201  7,157 
Go1 4,116  3,316    4,116  3,616    8,051  11,167    7,787  3,529 
Go2 16,109  13,114    16,109  15,192   36,251  62,155    35,032  14,502 
Go3 27,819  22,474    27,819  26,009    68,371  132,411    66,550  25,069 
Pi1 12,020  9,691    12,020  10,869    26,024  41,503    24,232  10,599 
Pi2 5,214  4,186    5,214  4,554    11,113  16,670    10,658  4,503 
Pi3 14,846  11,892    14,846  12,884   14,846  79,142    39,822  13,040 
Wheat and soybean farms 
Pe1 24,028  20,072    24,028  33,277    40,968  101,925    37,341  25,749 
Pe2 25,354  21,056    25,354  33,444   41,233  93,245    38,211  26,241 
Pe3 22,121  18,331    22,121  27,724   36,868  78,891    33,595  22,744 
Po1 31,976  25,971    31,976  39,971    52,281  107,538    48,601  32,234 
Po2 21,175  17,673    21,175  31,201   35,369  85,328    32,525  23,038 
Po3 6,499  5,625    6,499  10,299    9,819  27,589    10,357  7,289 
 
  With price expectations set at similar relative levels as they are now (P1), TGP is greater 
for each farm under CCP compared to the ACRE program. Since expected prices are well above 
the target prices and loan rates set in the farm bill, the only payments under CCP was direct 
payments. Under the ACRE program, the example farms do have a small expected ACRE 
payment which average 1% of TGP. However, the expected ACRE payment is less than the 
required 20% decrease in direct payments. Thus, under this price scenario of the expected 
national price being higher than the ACRE guarantee price, expected TGP is greater under the 
CCP program for each farm. This is easily seen in the indices of the ACRE TGP compared to the 
CCP TGP (Table 5 and Figure 1). 
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Table 5. Indices of expected total government payments (TGP) with Counter-cyclical 
Payments (CCP) set to 100 for each farm 
County  Price Scenario 1    Price Scenario 2  Price  Scenario  3  Price  Scenario  4 
& farm  CCP  ACRE    CCP  ACRE   CCP  ACRE   CCP  ACRE 
Corn and soybean farms 
Co1  100  81    100  90   100  167  100  40 
Co2  100  80    100  85   100  164  100  38 
Co3  100  81    100  90   100  167  100  39 
Fa1  100  82    100  98   100  190  100  42 
Fa2  100  82    100  94   100  180  100  37 
Go1  100  81    100  88   100  139  100  45 
Go2  100  81    100  94   100  171  100  41 
Go3  100  81    100  93   100  194  100  38 
Pi1  100  81    100  90   100  159  100  44 
Pi2  100  80    100  87   100  150  100  42 
Pi3  100  80    100  87   100  533  100  33 
Wheat and soybean farms 
Pe1  100  84  100 138    100 249    100  69 
Pe2  100  83  100 132    100 226    100  69 
Pe3  100  83  100 125    100 214    100  68 
Po1  100  81  100 125    100 206    100  66 
Po2  100  83  100 147    100 241    100  71 
Po3  100  87  100 158    100 281    100  70 
               
Average    82    107*     214     50 
Max    87    158     533      71 
Min    80     85     139     33 
*Under price scenario 2, the average index was 91 for corn and soybean farms under the ACRE program  
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Figure 1. Index of Total Government Payments (TGP) if national market prices are higher than 
ACRE guarantee prices    13
In price scenario 2 (P2), expected national prices are set at similar levels as the market 
now says, but the ACRE guarantee prices are moved closer to the expected national price and, 
for wheat, above the national price. This price scenario may occur in the second year of the 
ACRE program if market prices stayed rather stable and thus the ACRE guarantee prices would 
be calculated from higher prices. With these price expectations (P2), TGP is greater under CCP 
for the 11 example corn and soybean farms compared to the ACRE program. However, TGP is 
greater under ACRE for the six example wheat and soybean farms. This difference in outcome is 
primarily due to the ACRE guarantee price for wheat is higher than the expected national price 
wheat in P2 while the opposite relationship is expected for corn and soybean. All the example 
farms have an expected ACRE payment under P2 which averages 42% of TGP for the wheat and 
soybean farms and 12% for corn and soybean farms. For wheat and soybean farms, the expected 
ACRE payment is greater than the required 20% decrease in direct payments. For corn and 
soybean farms, the expected ACRE payment is less than the required 20% decrease in direct 
payments. Thus, under this price scenario of the expected national price being higher than the 
ACRE guarantee price, expected TGP is greater under the CCP program for each farm. This is 
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Figure 2. Index of expected total government payments (TGP) if national market prices and 
ACRE guarantee prices are at similar but high levels   14
  If expectations for the national prices quickly dropped leaving the ACRE guarantee 
prices at higher relative levels (P3), the benefits under the two programs would be greatly 
different from the first two price scenarios. Under P3, TGP would be larger for each farm under 
ACRE compared to the CCP program. Under this price scenario, expected national prices are 
below target prices and loan rates set in the farm bill, so farms were estimated to receive both  
direct payments and either CCP or ACRE payments depending on which program they were 
signed up for. However, TGP is higher for every example farm under the ACRE program since 
the revenue guarantees were based on the higher prices before the simulated price drop. TGP for 
the wheat and soybean farms are higher relatively since the wheat yields are also relatively 
higher compared to corn and soybean yields. For the 17 example farms, the expected CCP 
payment under P3 is on average 56% of TGP and the expected ACRE payment is on average 
79% of TGP. The expected ACRE payment is 79% of TGP for all farms, but the CCP payment is 
66% of TGP for corn and soybean farms while the CCP payment is 39% for wheat and soybean 
farms. Under this price scenario of the expected national price being much lower than the ACRE 
guarantee price, expected TGP is greater under the ACRE program for each farm. This is easily 
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Figure 3. Index of expected total government payments (TGP) if national market prices are 
considerably lower than the high ACRE guarantee prices 
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  While the fourth price scenario of all prices returned to their 5-year average from 2001-
2005 is unlikely to occur, the impact of that price level is interesting to evaluate since those are 
the price levels closer to current target prices and loan rates. With price expectations set at these 
historical levels (P4) which are much lower than current levels, TGP is greater for each farm 
under CCP compared to the ACRE program. For the 17 example farms, TGP under the ACRE 
program is only half of the estimated TGP under the CCP (Figure 4). Price scenario 4 shows how 
well CCP (which considers only prices) supports farm income when prices are close to or below 
target prices compared to ACRE with its protection of revenue (i.e., both prices and yields). In 
this price situation (P4), the effects of considering both price and yield variations is clearly seen 
since ACRE payments are essentially only direct payments. That is, prices and yields tend to 
move in countervailing directions especially at the national and state levels so an ACRE payment 
is seldom triggered. When considered by themselves, prices drop below target levels more often 
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Figure 4. Index of expected total government payments (TGP) if national market prices and 
ACRE guarantee prices were at 2001-2005 averages 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
As stated earlier, the choice between CCP and ACRE depends in large part on one’s view 
of what the direction of future prices will be. Since choosing the ACRE program requires a 20% 
cut in direct payments, the choice is not obvious nor is there a simple rule that applies to all 
farmers or even one farmer. If prices are expected to remain at or above the ACRE price 
guarantee, CCP is the best choice since government payments are expected to be lower under the 
ACRE program—as shown in the first price scenario. However, if national market prices fall 
sufficiently, the ACRE program becomes the best choice since ACRE payments will be higher—
as shown in the third price scenario. The national market price does not have to be much lower 
for ACRE to be the preferred choice—as shown for wheat-soybean farms in price scenario 2.  
It is essentially impossible to describe simple rules of thumb or breakeven prices to help 
farmers decide whether to sign up for ACRE or stay with CCP. This difficulty is due to several 
factors: the complexity of the program rules, the requirement to sign up all program crops on a 
farm, the potential government payment for only one crop even though direct payments and loan 
rates are cut for all crops, the uncertainty of future prices and yields, and the variation in how an 
individual farm’s yields vary in relationship to its state yields.  
Thus, each farmer needs to evaluate their conditions and evaluation of future prices and 
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